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Independence of Bulgarian Judges
BY JUDGE EVGENI GEORGIEV*
I. Introduction
It is believed that he primary purpose of judicial adjudication is
to restore social peace through settling conflicts.' Courts are
entrusted, therefore, with great powers and must guarantee that they
use them justly, although this may depend on the personality of the
judge.2 To this end, it is critical that judges be independent and
impartial in resolving conflicts, otherwise they will create conflicts
themselves. However, there is concern that judges could have their
independence influenced by feelings and perceptions, as they are
only human. The intensity of those feelings and perceptions depend
on the personality of the judge, but also on the environment in which
she works. This material looks for an answer to the question of
whether Bulgarian Judges have reached a level of independence in
the last twenty-five years (since the fall of the Communist Regime),
by examining the type of people appointed to become judges, as well
as the procedure for that appointment and the methods the Bulgarian
Justice System uses to assure its judges are independent.
* Mr. Georgiev currently sits on the Regional Court of Sofia and was the first judge to
implement mediation techniques in the courtroom. His pioneering support of mediation led
to the establishment of a court-connected settlement center, the first of its kind in Bulgaria.
1. JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW XIII (Greenwood Press 1968).
2. See Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, Lecture 1.
Introduction. The Method of Philosophy, 1 J. OF L. 329, 332-33 (2011) (discussing
importance of the court's responsibility).
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II. Brief Historical Overview of the
Bulgarian Justice System
The Bulgarian state is considered to be established in its
present geographic position in South Eastern Europe in 681 AD.3
The first sources regarding the administration of justice in Bulgaria
can be traced in the Responses of Pope Saint Nikolas I to Questions
of the Bulgarians from 866 AD. 4 Around the same period, the first
written Bulgarian law was adopted.' However, starting in 1396 and
until 1878, Ottoman rule interrupted the Bulgarian state tradition.
For centuries, the Ottoman Empire used a system of Islamic courts,
which underwent court reform following the French model from
1864 on.6 Before and after the modernization, local communities,
craftsman organizations, and religious groups were granted the right
to have courts, with nonprofessional judges elected by the
communities they served, that applied customary law to resolve
every day simple disputes.7 It was not uncommon for Bulgarians to
refer their disputes to local courts for the sake of convenience -
instead of requesting to use official Ottoman courts8 which were
expensive and untrustworthy.9
After the Russian-Turkish War from 1877-1878 and the Berlin
Treaty of 1878 that followed, the present Bulgarian state was
established as the Principality of Bulgaria."o While the institutions of
the new state were forming, Russian officials administered the
3. Bulgaria, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulgaria, (last visited Oct. 8,
2015).
4. Dimitar Tokushev, Sudebnata Vlast v Bulgaria, 21-22 (Sibi 2003).
5. The Ecloga Itself Was Based on the Justinian Code. Ecloga: Byzantine Law,
Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/178179/Ecloga,
(last visited Oct. 8, 2015).
6. See Avi Rubin, Legal Borrowing and Its Impact on Ottoman Legal Culture in the
Late Nineteenth Century, 22 CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 279, 279-303 (2007) (discussing the
Ottoman Empire's court system).
7. TOKUSHEV, SYDEBNATA VLAST V BULGARIA, 67-83 (Sibi, 2003).
8. See Jani Kirov, Foreign Law Between "Grand Hazard" and Great Irritation: The
Bulgarian Experience After 1878, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAw 699, 710 (2009).
9. See TOKUSHEV, SYDEBNATA VLAST V. BULGARIA, 69 (Sibi, 2003) citing STEFAN
BOBCHEV, BULGARSKO OBICHAINO SUDEBNO PRAVO, SBORNIK NARODNI UMOTVORENIA I
NAUKA, VOL. 37, 15 (1927).
10. Principality ofBulgaria, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principalityo fB
ulgaria, (last visited Oct. 8, 2015).
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country for about a year - aiming to build a court system on local
traditions allowing fair participation of the Christian population in
administering justice. The local courts were preserved and a modern
court system was designed and developed resembling the Ottoman
system, which had three levels: trial courts, intermediate courts of
appeal, and a Supreme Court." Once the national Bulgarian
institutions were established, a fast pace reception of foreign law
began in an effort to modernize the country.12
Problems with the courts appeared soon after their composition.
The majority of the problems were related to judges' competence,13
insufficient funding,'4 inefficiency,5 and corruption based on
political influence,16 as well s bribery." The government took
action to deal with these problems and by the 1940s the courts were
more independent and better staffed."
11. TOKUSHEV, SYDEBNATA VLAST V BULGARIA, 132-154 (Sibi, 2003).
12. Kirov, supra note 8, at 714.
13. In 1880-1881 there were seven Justices at the Supreme Court but only three of them
had legal a education (Stefan Bobchev, Iz Spomenite na Edin Star Magistrat, 34 Juridicheski
Pregled 4-5, 151 (1933).) In 1887 throughout the country there were altogether 341 judges,
prosecutors and their assistants, investigators, and justices of the peace from which only
sixty-seven had legal education (Tokushev, Sudebnata Vl st v Bulgaria at 181 citing Doklad
na Negovo Velichestvo Bulgarskia Knjaz Ferdinant I ot Ministerskia Syvet, 341 (1907).)
See also T. Hinkov, Uredbata v Nashite Sudilista, 12 JURIDICHESKI PREGLED 7, 333-340
(1901).
14. For the poor conditions the trial court in Orhanie (Botevgrad) operated in 1878 see
Toma Vasiljov, Pyrvata Sudebna Vlast v Novoosvobodena Bulgaria, 30 JURIDICHESKI
PREGLED 1, 29-32 (1929.) For the insufficient payment of judges see Ivan Brunekov,
Dostatuchen li e Systavyt na sudiite, 12 JURIDICHESKI PREGLED 3, 153 (1901). The latter
author criticized that judges' payment was lower than those of teachers, bank clerks, and
army officers. See also V. Domuschiev, Slabata Dejatelnost i Nezainteresovanost na
Nashite Magistrati kym Razvitieto na Pravnata Nauka, 16 JURIDICHESKI PREGLED 1, 34-37
(1905.) For a table comparing judges' payments to those of other governmental employees
see Tedemir, Neduzi v Pravosudieto, 16 JURIDICHEsKI PREGLED 6, 366-367 (1905).
15. Domuschiev, 16 JURIDICHESKI PREGLED at 35.
16. See Hinkov, 12 JURIDICHESKI PREGLED 7, 333-34 ("[i]n any local and district court
the one with the political power was running the court on his own will.").
17. See Domuschiev, 16 JURIDICHESKI PREGLED 1 at 37. (The author shared about the
existence of "for-profit teams composed of attorneys and justices of the peace" to
compensate the low payment of judges).
18. In 1892 the Law School at Sofia University was established. In December 1898
judges were granted tenure upon meeting some requirements (See Stefan Bobchev, Za
Nesmenjaemostta na Sudiite, 9 JURIDICHESKI PREGLED 9, 449-452 (1901.) Concerning
judges tenure before 1944 See Evgeni Yochev, Turnovskata Konstitucia i Nesmenjaemostta
na Sudiite, JURIDICHESKI PREGLED 1 (2009); Evgeni Yochev, Liberalnifat Model na
Nesmenjaemostta na Sudiite, PRAVNA MisuL 4 (2009); Evgeni Yochev, Zakonodatelno
Urejdane na Principa na Nesmenjaemostta na Sudiite ot Pravitelstvoto na Narodnata
2016] 213
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In the fall of 1944, the Communist Regime in Bulgaria took
drastic actions to secure its power using large-scale terror against the
populationl9 and the judiciary.20 By 1950, about 50% of the judges
who had been recruited before 1944 were dismissed.2' On paper, the
justice system may have looked independent but how it operated on
certain cases reveals the pervasive political corruption. Such was the
case in Texim.
In mid-April 1971 Ilija Bajchev, the Chief Judge of the Sofia
City Court, was called to appear before the Administrative
Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. He
was told that it was decided that he would preside over the panel
hearing the Texim case and the case should be adjudicated abiding by
the law.22 (Texim was a Bulgarian economic group operated until
196923 when ten of its executives were indicted for economic
crimes.) Both before and during the trial, Chief Judge Bajchev was
asked about his view on the weaknesses of the prosecution by several
people: the Minister of Justice, the Chief Justice and the Attorney
General, the Head of the Judicial Department on behalf of the
Deputy Minister of Justice, and a prosecutor of the Head Prosecutors
Office, Justice Menev. Chief Judge Bajchev presided over the panel
which found the CEO of Texim not guilty. Upon appeal, a three-
Justice panel of the Supreme Court, including Justice Menev,
reversed the verdict and the indicted parties were imprisoned. Chief
Judge Bajchev was "asked" to retire and Justice Menev replaced him
Partija, JURIDICHESKI SVJAT 2 (2008). In 1910 was created the Supreme Judicial Council
with significant functions in the initial selection and promotion of judges (Tokushev,
Sudebnata Vast v Bulgaria at 191-192; Angel Djambazov, Pravosudnata Sistema na
Bulgaria 1878-1944, 124-126 (Nauka i Izkustvo 1990); Evgeni Yochev, Izmenenifata i
Dopulnenifata na Zakona za Ustrojstvo na Sudilistata (1910-1911) i Vyzpriemaneto na
Evropejskia Model na Sudoustrojstvo, Juridicheski Svjat 2 (2010).
19. Ldszl6 Karsai, Crime and Punishment: People's Courts, Revolutionary Legality,
and the Hungarian Holocaust, 4 INTERMARIUM 1, 6 (2000-2001), http://ece.columbia.ed
u/files/ece/images/karsai2.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2015).
20. Three former Ministers of Justice were sentenced to death. Indicted and convicted
were the former Attorney General, the former Chief Justice of the Marshal Court of
Cassation, justices and prosecutors of the Supreme Court of Cassation, judges and
prosecutors of the Marshal Courts, judges of regular district and appeals courts (Tokushev,
Sudebnata Vlast v Bulgaria at 295-296).
21. See Tokushev, Sudebnata Vlast v Bulgaria at 298.
22. Ilija Bajchev, Sudeben Proces ili Fars. Pametni Belejki, 15.
23. Georgi Naydenov, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GeorgiNaydenov, (last
visited Oct. 8, 2015).
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as Chief Judge of the Sofia City Court.24
This was the judicial cultural legacy on which Bulgaria has built
its Justice System since the fall of the Communist Regime.25 The
organization of courts which existed during the Communist time -
one level review of trial judgments, three levels of courts (regional,
district, and Supreme Court) - was amended during the 1990s to
provide for two levels of review and as a result, five intermediate
courts of appeal were created. At present, regional courts are trial
courts with limited jurisdiction;26 district courts are both trial courts
with general jurisdiction and courts of appeals for regional courts;27
courts of appeal review district courts, whereas the Supreme Court of
Cassation reviews courts of appeals.28  A separate tier of
administrative courts has been also created.
III. Factors That May Affect Judges' Independence
Before inquiring what can influence a judge in performing her
judicial functions and how those influences can be limited, it would
be beneficial to clarify what is the job of a judge. Professor Geoffrey
Hazard and Professor Angelo Dondi answer in Legal Ethics. A
Comparative Study that, "[a] conscientious judge aims at deciding a
controversy according to the most accurate practicable assessment of
the facts and most technically accurate conception of the law." 29 To
do this successfully, a judge needs to have a clear and uninfluenced
mind. Five years ago, a very good friend of mine, a retired
Portuguese judge with over forty years of experience during and after
Salazar's regime, shared with me his view that independence is a
state of mind of the individual. Starting from this point -
independence is a state of mind - pragmatic analyses could help to
24. Id. at 19, 20, 44, 39, 52-54.
25. For a balanced view on the Bulgarian Justice System in 1980s, see Pencho Penev,
Sudebnata Vlast v Bulgaria 1989-2014. Problemi na Syvremennia Diskurs, 47-70 (Sibi
2014).
26. Judicial System Act [JSA], State Gazette [SG] No. 69/2008 art. 76 (Bulg.); Code of
Civ. Proc. State Gazette [SG] No. 69/2008, art. 103 (Bulg.).
27. JSA, SG No. 69/2008, art. 82-83 (Bulg.); Code of Civ. Proc. SG No. 69/2008, art.
105 (Bulg.).
28. JSA, SG No. 69/2008, art. 101(1), 108(1) (Bulg.).
29. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & ANGELA DONDI, LEGAL ETHICS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 64
(Stanford University Press 2004).
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identify what can affect the clear mind of a judge deciding a case.
If independence is a state of mind, it can be affected by feelings
and perceptions that often depend on personality and experience.
Feelings and perceptions, however, can be triggered also by factors
outside the person, such as behavior patterns within the community
and outside pressures and incentives. Some of the feelings that can
influence our minds can be fear, allegiance, frustration, insecurity, or
anger. Perceptions might be thwarted by failures of the character
such as vanity, laziness, and greed.
To a great extent a judge's ability to keep her mind clear while
deciding a case depends on her personal ability to cope with feelings
and perceptions that could influence her mind. It is very critical,
therefore, that the justice system recruit judges that have that ability.
Keeping a judge's mind clear also depends on the will and the ability
of the justice system to help judges successfully cope with those
feelings and perceptions.30 From this, it can be inferred that to have,
clear-minded judges, a justice system should be able to have a vision
and policy applied to it.
How and what kind of judges are recruited? How can a system
make sure its judges feel unaffected by feelings and perceptions that
can influence their decisions, while fulfilling their judicial duties?
The following chapter will discuss what Bulgaria has done in these
areas in the last twenty-five years since the fall of the Communist
Regime.
30. For similar analysis see also RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 11 (Harvard
University Press 2008).
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IV. What Has Been Done in Bulgaria to
Ensure Independent Judges
A. How and What Kind ofJudges are Recruited
1. Who Recruits Judges
The Supreme Judicial Council (Council) is responsible for the
initial selection and appointment of judges.3' It is also responsible for
judges' promotions, professional development, and disciplining.32
How the Council is composed and how it operates, therefore, is
crucial to providing for an independent Judiciary.
a. How the Council is Composed
The Council has twenty-five members: eleven elected by
Separate General Assemblies of JudgeS33 - Prosecutors and
Investigators;34 eleven elected by the Parliament;35 the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of Cassation, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Administrative Court, and the Attorney General - ex officio
members of the Council.3 6 The nomination and selection procedure
for members of the Council was initially regulated by the Supreme
Judicial Council Act from 1991, and later by the Judicial System Act
(JSA) from 1994 and from 2007. Until the 2011-2012 amendments
of the JSA, the candidates for members of the Council were
nominated at the date when either the Professional General
Assemblies or the Parliament voted for them. This left no time for
any screening or challenge to be brought regarding the candidates'
qualifications or integrity.37 As a result, not only was there a lot of
31. Const. of the Republic of Bulg. SG No. 12/ 2007, art. 129(1); JSA, SG No. 69/2008
art. 16(1).
32. Const. of the Republic of Bulg. SG No. 12/2007, arts. 130(6), 2-3.
33. JSA, SG No. 69/2008, art. 17(3) (Bulg.).
34. The three Professional General Assemblies are composed of: judges, representatives
of each court; prosecutors, representatives of each prosecutor's office; and investigators,
representatives of each investigator's office. Those representatives are elected by the judges,
prosecutors, or investigators from the institution they represent.
35. Const. of the Republic of Bulg. SG No. 12/2007, art. 130(1).
3 6. Id.
37. Election of the Members of the Supreme Judicial Council: Hearings, (Jan. 22,
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room for behind the scene deals for nominations and election for
members of the Council, but the procedure also allowed
professionals with questionable integrity to be elected. This
sometimes led to controversial appointments and promotions of
judges;38 leading to feelings of underrepresentation and a lack of
trust in the Council.
The 2011-2012 amendments of the JSA implemented detailed
procedures for electing members of the Council, both from the
Parliament and the professional quota (judges, prosecutors, and
investigators). Those procedures required: (1) early nominations to
be well reasoned; (2) disclosure of financial status; (3) written
concepts of the candidates; (4) public hearings before a special
committee and the whole Parliament, as well as, before the
Professional General Assemblies including answering the questions
of nongovernmental organizations, (5) research and educational
institutions; and (6) public report of the special selection committee
of the Parliament for each nomination of its quota.39 Along with
these improvements, the number of the representatives at the
Professional General Assemblies was increased40 as a step to direct
elections. Although the amendments provided for greater
involvement of the professional community in the elections, as well
as increased transparency and publicity, the feeling of "behind the
scene deals" continues to exist. This is not unsurprising given the
long history of corrupt procedures.41
1992), http://www.parliament.bg/bg/plenaryst/ns/4/ID/2335 (last visited Oct. 8, 2015).
38. Judicial Reform Index for Bulgaria, 3 ABA CELLI 14, 19 (2006) (discussing the
appointments of judges).
39. JSA, SG No. 69/2008, as amended SG 1/2011 and SG 50/2012, art. 19 (Bulg.);
JSA, SG No. 69/2008, as amended SG 50/2012 and SG 50/2012, arts. 19(a)- 24 (Bulg.).
40. Compare JSA, as amended SG No. 50/2012, art. 20(3) (Bulg.), with JSA, SG No.
50/2012, art. 20(1), (Bulg.).
41. Scandals cherish this feeling: on June 28, 2013, in the media leaked phone
conversations among Chief Prosecutors of several prosecutors' offices who were discussing
assuring support hrough the representatives of the institutions they ran to the Prosecutors
General Assembly for having Kamen Sitnilski, former Deputy Attorney General, elected as
a member of the Council (see Galina Gerginova, Prokuraturata Protestira Uvolnenieto na
Kamen Sitnilski, Sudebni Reportaji (July 21, 2014)) http://judicialreports.bg/2014/07/npo
KypaTypaTa-upoTecTupa-OT M0HaTa-H/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2015).
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b. How the Council Operates
Initially, the Council only had meetings at least once every three
months, but with time it became more active in appointing,
promoting, and disciplining judges, prosecutors, and investigators,
and therefore required more operational capacity. Thus, ever since
2007, the Council has been meeting at least once a week4 2 and its
member's work only for the Council. Initially, the Council depended
on the Ministry of Justice administratively,43 later on, however, the
Council secured its own small, but growing administration. It's
number was first limited to not higher than two and a half, then to
not more than three times the number of the members of the Council.
However, in 2011 the limitation was lifted44 and now it has about
120 people in the administration. Concerns about the
bureaucratization of the Council, resulting in detachment of the
professional groups it works for, and inability to attract well-
qualified professionals, have provoked debates whether to implement
changes that would allow most of the commissions of the Council to
work on sessions and only have a few permanent members.4 5
2. How Judges Are Recruited
The question how to recruit judges is at least twofold. On the
one hand, the criteria the candidates for judgeships need to meet,
along with the professional path for entering Judiciary, are important.
On the other hand, it is, if not more critical, at least as critical who
applies the selection criteria and how they do it.
42. JSA, SG No. 69/2008, art. 33(1) (Bulg.).
43. JSA, SG No. 59/1994, art. 25 (Bulg.).
44. Compare JSA, SG No. 1/2011, art. 30(3) as amended, with JSA, SG No. 33/2009,
art. 30(3) & JSA, SG No. 64/2007, art. 30(3).
45. Aktualizirana Strategia za Produjavane na Reformata v Sudebnata Sistema, 3
(2014) (Updated Strategy for Continuing the Reform in the Justice System)
http://mjs.bg/Files/IlpoeKTHa_AKTyanH3HpaHacTpaTerHx_3a-clge6HaCpe4opma635489
116277892922.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2015).
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a. Criteria Applied in Recruiting Judges
Since the 1990s and until present, the criteria for judgeship the
candidates has been remarkably stable. The requirements concern
candidates' legal competence, integrity, and mental health.46 The
legal competence requirement is determined by the quality of legal
education, professional training required upon graduation, and the
exam for entering the legal profession - all of which, however, suffer
serious deficiencies.
Bulgarian legal education, at least at Sofia University Law
School, is generally perceived as having an efficient and well-
structured theoretical component.47 That idea is archaic, however.
Actual case study is rare, and the Socratic Method of teaching is
even less common; lectures before large audiences are the rule. Legal
research and writing does not exist in the law school curriculum and
trial advocacy and legal ethics might be taught only on an occasional
basis by U.S. visiting professors. Students try to compensate for the
lack of practical training at law schools by participating in
extracurricular moot courts and clinics (when available), getting jobs
at law firms (for little to no compensation), and interning for judges,
which might be challenging to get.4 8
There is a six-month professional training requirement49 upon
the completion of legal studies.so Students are not compensated for
their work during the training." Most often the training is a mere
formality due to its short period5 2 and its timing. To break this
46. JSA, SG No. 69/2008, art.162 (6) (Bulg.).
47. Legal Education: Problematic Areas and Perspectives, 1 BILI 1, 9 (2009)
(discussing Bulgarian legal education).
48. Judicial Reform Index for Bulgaria, 1 ABA CEELI 1, 8 (2002); Judicial Reform
Index for Bulgaria, 2 ABA CEELI 1, 6 (2004); Judicial Reform Index, supra note 39, at 15;
Judicial Reform Review for Bulgaria, 4 BILI 1, 18 (2013); Legal Profession Reform Index
for Bulgaria, 1 ABA CEELI 1, 19-20 (2004); The Legal Profession Reform Index, 2 ABA
CEELI 1, 25 (2006); Legal Education: Problematic Areas and Perspectives, supra note 48 at
9 http://www.bili-bg.org/11/page.html.
49. In the last ywenty years this period has ranged from three months to one year.
50. JSA, SG No. 69/2008, art. 294(1) (Bulg.).
51. Id. art. 297(2).
52. The time of the training is dispersed among five institutions leaving a little bit more
than a month for each one of them. This period is so short that students could hardly gain
some meaningful practical experience with the institution they work with. More
fundamentally, given that at the beginning of the training most students have no practical
220 [Vol. 39:1
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vicious cycle, at least some institutions have started to implement
longer internship programs.5 3 There is also an exam upon the
completion of professional training, which is supposed to check both
theoretical knowledge and practical skills of law students.54 In
reality, it is just a lighter version of the final exams at he end of law
school, with no practical component and a very low failure rate. All
of this results in inadequate entry-level legal competence for
Bulgarian judges. This might be a source of uncertainty that could
lead to failures in the decision-making process, sloppiness, and
delay, all of which can influence a judge's clear mind. The system
tries to ameliorate these effects through judges' initial training.
The integrity criteria requires judicial candidates to: (1) not have
been convicted of a felony; (2) possess the moral and professional
standing required by the Code of Ethical Conduct of Bulgarian
Magistrates (the Code of Ethical Conduct); and (3) not have been an
elected member of the Council who has been disciplinary dismissed
for compromising the reputation of the Judiciary." It took some
time not only for the Code of Ethical Conduct to be adopted, but also
for judges to realize the need for such Code.5 6 Initially, the Union of
Judges in Bulgaria (the first association of judges) adopted basic
ethical rules to be abided by its members. These rules were approved
in 2004 by the Council to apply to all judges." In 2009, the Council
adopted the Code of Ethical Conduct developing in detail seven
principles - independence, impartiality, justice and transparency,
courtesy and tolerance, honor and propriety, competence and
qualification, and confidentiality.
legal skills and the short time of the training, judges could not rely on real help by students.
If judges are busy, which is the case in metropolitan areas, the combined result of their
heavy dockets and no real help from students is lower motivation of judges to work with
students.
53. Regional Court of Sofia, (Oct. 8,2015), http://www.srs.justice.bg/161-CTamaHTCK
a nporpama; The Law School of the University of National and World Economy, (Oct. 8,
2015), http://faculties.unwe.bg/law/bg/pages/77; Bulgarian Judicial Association, (Oct. 8,
2015), http://www.judges.bg/bg/activities/stu dents/rules.
54. JSA, SG No. 69/ 2008, art. 294 (2) (Bulg.).
55. Id. arts. 162(3)-(5) (Bulg.).
56. Judicial Reform Index for Bulgaria, supra note 49 at 38 (2002).
57. See Judicial Reform Index for Bulgaria, supra note 49 at 32 (2004).
58. Code of Ethics for the Behaviour of Bulgarian Magistrates (May 20, 2009),
http://www.vss.justice.bg/en/root/f/upload/5/judicialsystem-codeofethics e ng.pdf.
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b. Professional Paths for Entering the Judiciary
The selection criteria for judges, and to whom they apply, go
hand in hand with the search for good and independent judges. To
whom the criteria are applied, depends on the professional path to
becoming a judge, which in turn determines what kind of judges the
system will have, how they will behave, and how they will perform
their duties. Understanding how the professional path chosen to
become a judge influences a judge's performance would allow a
justice system to ameliorate the side effects of the applied model of
the professional path for becoming a judge in the given country.
There are two professional paths for becoming a judge in
Bulgaria - the junior judge's path and the so-called "initial
appointment." The majority of judges follow the junior judge's path.
It allows for law graduates, upon completing their professional
training, without other prior legal experience required, to become
junior judges at district courts. For a certain time before being
appointed to regional courts, they work in a panel with two senior
judges having equal decisional power.59 The "initial appointment"
allows legal professionals to become judges at any court level - if
they have a certain prior legal experience.60 The higher the position
applied for, the more experience is required.6 1 "Initial appointment"
is applied to only 20% of the vacant judgeships so the career
development of judges in lower courts is not hindered.62
There is no study on how the professional path for becoming a
judge impacts the performance and behavior of Bulgarian judges.
General and speculative assumptions could be made that the age of
junior judges could be both a blessing and a curse. Junior judges
might be idealistic, enthusiastic, energetic, devoted, quick learners,
open to change; but they could also be, at least initially, less self-
confident, easy to manipulate, detached from society, too formal and
technical,6 3 inefficient, and arrogant. The latter failures of
59. JSA, SG No. 69/2008, arts. 181(1), 239(1), 240(1), 243(1) (Bulg.).
60. Id. at art. 181(2) (Bulg.).
61. Id. at art. 164 (Bulg.).
62. Id. at art. 178(1) (Bulg.).
63. Marina Kurkchiyan, Comparing Legal Cultures: Three Models of Court for Small
Civil Cases, 5 J. CoMP. L. 169, 188-190 (2010) (discussing the Bulgarian legal culture and
Bulgarian judges' tendency toward appreciation of legal technicalities and strict application
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professional character might also demonstrate a professional who has
entered the judiciary through the "initial appointment" path.
However, because the right selection procedures are applied by a
well-composed group of people, these failures are easier to spot -
since there is greater information available about the candidate and
the information's sources.
c. Procedure for Selecting Judges and Its Application
Several tendencies of improvement can be traced to the
procedures for selecting judges: (i) significantly reducing the role of
Chief Judges through implementing initial selection based on a
centralized exam; (ii) increasing the transparency of the procedures;
and (iii) dividing the selection authority between the Council and
exam commissions of five members, with active judges and at least
one law professor randomly appointed. The implementation of these
improvements was a slow and lengthy process.
Until 2002, when a court had a vacant judgeship, the Chief
Judge made a nomination of a prospective candidate. The lack of
national standards for selecting candidates64 and the lack of
reasonable capacity of Council to evaluate the nominees made the
appointment a mere formality.65 Suspicion existed that many judges
were appointed because of family or other connections.66 Such
system could work if for many years chief judges were always
conscientious and sensitive in selecting new judges and thus created
deference and trust in the process. Otherwise, it could result in
abuses or distrust even when slight changes are made.
At present, vacant judgeships, the selection procedure is
publicly announced.67 Candidates submit application documents
proving their competence, integrity, and mental health, which are
of the law).
64. Very few courts, mainly in larger metropolitan areas such as Sofia and Plovdiv,
used exams to select candidates for junior judges' position.
65. Judicial Reform Index for Bulgaria, supra note 49 at 9 (2002).
6 6. Id
67. JSA, SG No. 33/2009, art. 179 (Bulg.); Pravila za Provejdane na Konkursi za
Mladshi Sudii i Mladshi Prokurori, za Purvonachalno Naznachavane i Povishavane v
Dlujnost i Premestvane na Sudii, Prokurori i Sledovateli [Rules for Competitions], (Bulg.),
available at http://vss.justice.bg/root/f/upload/8/Pravila_konkursi-ml-10-06-2015.pdf.
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reviewed by a Commission of the Council in order to admit them to
the exam.68 The Council randomly selects judges and law professors
as exam commissioners to prepare a written exam based on problem-
solving, to administer, and to grade it as well. Additionally, an oral
exam is audio recorded for those who pass the written exam. Finally,
the candidates are ranked based on their overall exam performance.69
The Council appoints the best in the rankings upon receiving the
opinion of its Ethical Commission about the integrity of the
candidates.70
Generally, the exams are accepted as fairly administered; which
is one explanation for the high number of candidates,71 although
another explanation could be the increased compensation of judges
after 2001 leading to more applicants.72 Both written and oral exams
mainly screen the technical theoretical legal competence of
candidates.73 The process does not allow for the evaluation of the
candidates' working habits, skills, or personality74 due to the limited
sources of information the Council uses about prior observable
behavior of the candidates.75 It would be fairly safe to generalize,
however, the young age of entry-level judges would be problematic
in other civil law countries using a similar system of judicial
appointments.76
68. Id. arts. 8-9; JSA, SG No. 1/2011, art. 182(1).
69. JSA, SG No. 1/2011, arts. 182, 183, 184 (Bulg.); JSA, SG No. 33/2009, art. 185
(Bulg.); JSA, SG No. 32/2011, art. 186- 186(a) (Bulg.); Rules for Competitions, supra note
70 at art. 10-25.
70. JSA, SG No. 69/2008, arts. 186(a)(4), 186(a)(2) (Bulg.); Rules for Competitions,
supra note 70 at art. 26-27.
71. Judicial Reform Index for Bulgaria, supra note 49 at 6 (2004); Judicial Reform
Index for Bulgaria, supra note 39 at 16; Judicial Reform Review for Bulgaria, supra note 49
at 24.
72. Infra IV.B.1.(b).
73. Judicial Reform Index for Bulgaria, supra note 39, at 16.
74. Id.
75. HAZARD & DONDI, supra note 30, at 80 ("[b]ecause it is impossible by objective
evidence to determine whether a judge is subjectively impartial, legal standards of
impartiality necessarily refer to observable behavior.") (The same test could be applied in
initial judicial selection - candidates' personality to be evaluated based on data about their
prior observable behavior.).
76. In Germany, for example, upon completing law school students have two years of
paid professional training (see PETER L. MURRAY, RoLF STORNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE,
7-9 (Carolina Academic Press 2005).). A longer professional training allows for better
observation of the candidates performance and personality but it is questionable whether
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3. Does Judicial Appointment in Bulgaria Provide for
Independent Judges?
Allegiance is one of the feelings that can influence judges'
independence. The selection process for initial appointment of judges
in Bulgaria is well balanced to not allow judges to feel allegiance to
those who appoint them since: (i) the candidates' appointment is
based solely on their merits - even only technical theoretical
knowledge of law, which is a source of self-confidence; (ii) the
selection procedure is difficult to be manipulated since the decision
is made by several independent bodies; and (iii) the composition and
selection of the Council is also a guarantee for judges' independence.
While most excellent students are hardworking, it is unclear
whether they will be able to effectively and efficiently carry on the
burden of taking decisions all the time. This could be proved only
through data about prior observable behavior. The process has no
tools to analyze such behavior to identify whether judicial candidates
can cope with fear, anger, and vanity that could influence their clear
mind in deciding upon a case. The dearth of information about
observable behavior could be an excuse for a junior judge's path but
not for "initial appointment."
B. How Bulgaria's Justice System Assures Its Judges Are
Independent in Fulfilling Their Judicial Duties
In order to have uninfluenced judges, the Bulgarian Justice
System provides them with training, a stable office, and career
development. In return, the system expects good behavior from
judges, otherwise they face the possibility of disciplinary sanctions in
breaches of judicial duties.
1. Training, Stable Office, and Career Development
a. Training
During the first ten years upon the fall of the Communist
regime, the Bulgarian Justice System did little, if anything,
concerning judges training. The Magistrates Training Center was
two years is substantial enough.
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established in 1999 to provide initial and continuing legal training to
judges,77 which in 2003 was transformed into the National Institute
of Justice (NIJ). 78 The NIJ is financed mainly by the Justice System
budget and supervised by a board of five representatives of the
Council and two of the Minister of Justice.79
Presently, the NIJ provides mandatory initial trainings that are
practically oriented - nine months for candidates for junior judges80
and fifteen days for judges recruited through "initial appointment""
- as well as non-mandatory continuing legal education for judges and
court staff.82 Through senior judges' mentorship, the NIJ assists and
supervises the work of junior judges once they are appointed to
district courts.83 It has also started to experiment with offering
nonlegal classes in economics, accounting, psychology, media
relations, and ethics.84 The continuous efforts of the NIJ to improve
its operation, and the high motivation and competence of its staff,
make it one of the best working institutions of the Bulgarian Justice
System. At the moment, however, little attention has been paid to
case management techniques and skills - an issue that the NIJ is
planning to address.
b. Stable Office
Judges' stable office generally depends on their compensation,
workload, duration of service (tenure), and liability for judicial
misconduct (immunity).85 Until 2001, judge's salaries were
inadequate and many well-qualified judges left the judiciary to enter
77. Judicial Reform Index for Bulgaria, supra note 49, at 2.
78. Judicial Reform Index, supra note 49, at 7.
79. JSA, SG No. 69/2008, arts. 251, 255; JSA, SG No. 69/2008, art. 252, as amended,
SG No. 1/2011.
80. JSA, SG No. 69/2008, art. 249(1), 258 (Bulg.)
81. JSA, SG No. 69/2008, art. 259 (Bulg.); Pravilnik za Organizacijata i Dejnostta na
Nacionalnia Institut na Pravosudieto i na Negovata Administracia [Regulation of the NIJ,
SG No. 65/2011, art 40], (Bulg.), http://www.nij.bg/FileHandler.ashx?folderlD=89&fil
elD=5150.
82. JSA, SG. 69/2008, art. 258(l)-(2) (Bulg.).
83. Pravilnik za Organizacijata i Dejnostta na Nacionalnia Institut na Pravosudieto i na
Negovata Administracia [Regulation of the NIJ, art 40], (Bulg.).
84. Judicial Reform Review for Bulgaria, supra note 49, at 31 (2013).
85. DAWSON, supra note 1, at 134-145 (Professor John Dawson illustrated how personal
liability for misconduct of judicial office in Medieval Italy resulted in judges' fear of taking
decisions).
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private practice.86 Then, judges' remunerations started to be
increased and a few years later judges felt well compensated and the
adequacy and stability of their income led to the opposite trend:
attorneys started to apply for judgeships.8 ' Good salaries also
attracted more young professionals to the judiciary.88
The large differences in salaries of judges in different levels in
Bulgaria make faster promotion a lot more attractive. 89 If the system
has a fair and well thought out promotion mechanism, or does not
rely on promotion, higher salaries for higher level judges attract
more qualified professionals. But the higher salary and prestige
might make a not so conscientious judge easily influenced in
deciding a case by those her promotion depends on. End-of-year
bonuses, when given to Bulgarian judges and depending on their
amount, might also influence judges' independence since their
distribution is within the absolute discretion of chief judges.
An overworked judge is frustrated and stressed; which cannot
but affect her clear mind while deciding a case. Overwork could be
due to: (1) higher number of incoming cases than the judge normally
can cope with and (2) inability of judges to adjudicate large amounts
of cases. Large caseloads in the system and an inadequate number of
judges or distribution of cases among them, could contribute to the
former. The latter could be due to poor working ethics, little or no
case management knowledge and skills, lack of delegation culture,
inadequate procedural devices, and procedural culture.
Judges in Bulgaria, except hose in the three main metropolitan
areas, generally do not feel overworked. The reasons judges in Sofia
feel overloaded are not likely due to the insufficient number of
judges90 or the high numbers of cases filed; 91 but rather, the
86. Judicial Reform Index for Bulgaria, supra note 49, at 24 (2002).
87. Judicial Reform Index for Bulgaria, supra note 49, at 20 (2004).
88. Judicial Reform Index for Bulgaria, supra note 39, at 34 (2006).
89. These are the base monthly salaries for judges from different levels: 876.00 USD
for junior judges; 954.00 UDS for regional judges; 1,221.00 USD for district judges;
1,486.00 USD for court of appeals judges; 1,768 USD for Justices of the Supreme Court of
Cassation. Above their base monthly salary judges receive an extra 2% automatic payment
for every year of judicial service but not more than 40% plus extra payment for rank
(payment due for certain years of good service upon being positively evaluated.) For more
see 1546 lv. e naj-niskata zaplata v suda, 4367 e naj-visokata, available at http://www.24ch
asa.bg/Article.asp?Articleld=5051642 (last visited Oct. 26, 2016).
90. Supreme Judicial Council, (Dec. 31, 2014), http://www.vss.justice.bg/bg/start.htm;
Republic of Bulgaria: National Statistical Institute, (Dec. 31, 2014), http://www.nsi.bg
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92inadequate distribution of judges nationwide, poor case
management skills,93 low working ethics,94 and an underdeveloped
culture of judges to delegate responsibilities.95 While the Council is
currently working on establishing a system to objectively evaluate
the workload of judges and their proportionate distribution, and the
NIJ has implemented trainings for the supporting staff which will
hopefully increase judges' reliance on it, little has been done to
improve judges' management skills.
Tenure and immunity are also critical for judges' independence.
Under the Constitution, initially judges automatically acquired tenure
upon three years of judicial service until the retirement age of sixty-
five.96  Furthermore, Judges enjoyed criminal immunity for any
misconduct unless there was 2/3 majority vote permission of the
Council a criminal investigation to be initiated,97 as well as, civil
immunity for liability of misconduct in office.98 Later, through
several amendments of the Constitution, requirements for acquiring
tenure were increased and the criminal immunity of judges was
/en/content/6704/population-districts-municipalities-place-residence-and-sex; David S.
Clark, The Relative Importance of Judiciaries in Distinct Legal Traditions, in LAW AND
JUSTICE IN A MULTISTATE WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN 609, 611
(James A. R. Nafziger & Symeon C. Symeonides eds., Transnational Publishers 2002) ("As
of Jan. 20, 2011, Bulgaria had 2,285 judges while its population was 7,245,677 or thirty-one
judges per 100,000 people. For comparison, only about ten years earlier Germany had
twenty-seven judges per 100,000 people while the United States had nine judges.").
91. A civil trial judge of the Sofia City Court, the busiest of all district courts
nationwide, has a docket of about 200-250 cases and she receives around 200 new cases
each year along with about ninety interlocutory appeal motions against procedural orders of
judges from the Sofia Regional Court.
92. Judicial Reform Index for Bulgaria, supra note 39, at 63 (2006).
93. Techniques for concentrating the trial are used rarely, few judges refer to ADR
(mainly mediation,) most judges have poor settlement culture. All these combined with
insufficient number of court rooms and little use of default and summary judgments bring
delays in adjudicating cases as well as writing judgments.
94. The fact that delay has been the most prevalent sanction might be a sign that the
system does not pay attention to other abuses but it might also illustrate that some judges
have poor working ethics.
95. Judicial Reform Index for Bulgaria, supra note 49, at 43 (2002); Judicial Reform
Index for Bulgaria, supra note 49, at 38-39 (2004).
96. Const. of the Republic of Bulg. SG No. 69/ 2008, art. 129(3), as amended, SG No.
85/ 2003.
97. Const. of the Republic of Bulg. SG No. 69/ 2008, art. 132, as amended, SG No. 85/
2003, 12/ 2007; Zakon za Visshia Sudeben Suvet [Sup. Jud. Council Act] art 13 (repealed
SG No. 59/1994).
98. Const. of the Republic of Bulg. SG No. 69/ 2008, art. 132, as amended, SG No. 85/
2003, 12/ 2007.
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completely lifted.99 Now for judges to acquire tenure they must have
been in their office for five years and the Council decides whether to
grant tenure to a judge upon her work has been positively evaluated
by a Commission of the Council."oo While judges do not generally
perceive lifting immunity for criminal conduct as infringing their
independence,"o' it led to an increase in the number of investigated,
indicted, and convicted judges.1 02
c. Career Development
Career development of Bulgarian judges has undergone
significant changes; similar to those described about initial selection
and appointment of judges. Prior to 2006, promotion of judges
depended mainly on the initiative of their chief judges,'0 3 followed
by a decision of the Council - in many cases both were based on
seniority.104 Occasionally, judges felt some promotions were
motivated through political, social, or other connections,o but in
early 2000s a large number of judges left their office for political 0 6
99. Constitutional Amendment of 2003: Hearings on Parliament, (Sept. 3, 2003),
http://www.parliament.bg/bg/plenaryst/ns/1/ID/831; Delpeuch Thierry & Vassileva
Margarita, Contribution A une sociologie politique des entrepreneurs internationaux de
transferts de r6formes judiciaires, L'anne sociologique, 59, 2009/2 L'anne sociologique
371, available at http://www.cairn.info/article.php?ID ARTIC LE=A NSO 092 0371.
100. Const. of the Republic of Bulg. SG No. 69/ 2008, art. 129(3), as amended, SG No.
85/ 2003; JSA, SG No. 69/2008, art. 207, 209, as amended SG No. 64/2007, 33/2009,
1/2011 (Bulg.).
101. Judicial Reform Index for Bulgaria, supra note 39, at 46 (2006).
102. Judicial Reform Index for Bulgaria, supra note 49, at 46 (2013).
103. JSA, SG no. 64/2007 (repealed SG No.39/2006) (Bulg.); JSA, SG No. 39/2009, art.
127(g).
104. Judicial Reform Index for Bulgaria, supra note 49, at 46 (2013).
105. Id.
106. There was no official lustration of judges in Bulgaria upon the fall of the
Communist Regime compared to those in other Eastern European countries. Under § 5 of
the Transitional and Final Provisions of the Constitution, however, if within three months of
its establishment the Council did not find a lack of professional standing required, then the
judge acquired tenure. Thus, in 1992 judges were removed by the Council finding that they
did not have the professional standing required for being connected to the former
Communist party (see Mirela Veselinova, Bulgarskijat Konstitucionalizym - Realen ili
Nominalen, Praven Svjat (Oct. 18, 2013) http://www.legalworld.bg/32 928.bylgarskiiat-
konstitucionalizym---realen-ili-nominalen.html; see also Parl., Constitutional Amendment of
2003: Hearings on Parliament, 39th Regular Parl. (Sept. 3, 2003) available at
http://www.parliament.bg/bg/plenaryst/ns/1/ID/83 1.
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and financial reasons.'07 The opening of new judgeships08 opened
quickly providing for quick promotions. The tension created by
unjustified promotions was not so strong initially. Once the
vacancies were filled and the judges needed to stay longer at the
same position, the feelings of dissatisfaction of such promotions
increased.
Upon 2006, changes have been adopted to improve the
promotion process moving from one direction (promotion decisions
determined mainly on results of oral and written legal technical
exams)109 to another (promotion based only on an evaluation by a
Commission of the Council with limited administrative capacity).110
Today, the evaluation and oral legal technical exam both have equal
value at the final ranking."' The public announcements for
promotion competitions and the way the exam commissions are
composed follow the rules for competitions for initial selection of
judges.12 Evaluation is done once in four years first by a panel of
three judges randomly selected of a court of immediate higher level
than the one of the judge evaluated, then endorsed by a permanent
Commission of the Council, and finally approved by the Council
itself. The panel evaluates legal knowledge and skills, working
ethics, and organizational skills. They use data compiled about
incoming and completed cases, disposition time, reversed judgments,
continuing legal education (CLE) participation, brief evaluation by
the chief judge, reports on the judge from the Inspectorate of the
Council, information from the Ethical Committee of the court about
the integrity of the judge, and personal observations."3
107. Judicial Reform Index for Bulgaria, supra note 49, at 24 (2002).
108. While in 1992 according to MP Ljuben Kornezov there were about 1,000 judges
nationwide (Parl., Constitutional Amendment of 2003: Hearings on Parliament, 39th
Regular Parl) by 2011 they already were 2,285.
109. JSA, SG No. 69/2008 (repealed SG No. 64/2007) (Bulg.); JSA, SG No. 69/2008,
art. 30(10), as amended SG No. 39/2006 (Bulg.).
110. Id. at art. 127(b), as amended SG No. 39/2006 (Bulg.).
111. JSA, SG No. 69/2008, arts. 188- 194 (Bulg.).
112. Supra IV.A.2.(c).
113. JSA, SG No. 69/2008, art. 196- 209 (Bulg.); Metodika za Atestirane na Sudia,
Prokuror, Sledovatel Administrativen Rukovoditel i Zamestnik Administrativen Rukovoditel
[Methodology for Evaluation of Judge, Prosecutor, Investigator, Chief Judge, Chief Prosecutor
and Investigator as Well as Their Deputies], (Bulg.), adopted Nov. 28, 2011, (as amended July
26, 2013 and Mar. 12, 2014), http://www.vss.justice.bg/root/f/ upload/2/Metodikaatestirane-
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Compared to the promotion procedure in existence before 2006,
the present procedure is more elaborate and balances dispersing
functions among evaluating judges and the Council using diverse
sources of information about observable behavior. However, the
procedure does not take attorney evaluations into account. It is
questionable, however, whether it is wise to place equal value on the
evaluation of the judge's four-year work and an oral legal technical
exam lasting for about twenty minutes.
The procedure requires excellent planning and timely
administration of the competitions for promotion and initial selection
in order to fill the vacancies quickly. In reality, however, this is not
so, resulting in the system adjusting by using large scale temporary
reassignment of judges, at least in Sofia,114 of lower to higher courts
and from less busy to busier courts. Reassignment creates great risks
for the independence of the judges temporarily reassigned for several
reasons: (1) judges reassigned to higher courts are compensated as
higher court judges; (2) judges reassigned to another same level court
usually would like to settle in the place of reassignment; and (3) both
types of reassignment are believed to improve the chances the judge
is reassigned when vying for promotion or transferring. These
reasons might make reassigned judges unwilling to return to their
original courts, which could intensify their natural feelings of fear
and allegiance and increase their vulnerability to influences by the
chief judges who decide the reassignment.1 s
2. Disciplining Judges
The independence of judges also depends on whether the system
has implemented a fair and transparent process for sanctioning
judicial misconduct. Bulgaria has gone through a long development
of such sanctions. It started with a general ban against removing any
tenured judge,116 but soon arrived at a state where even members of
2014.pdf.
114. In Sofia City Court out of 134 sitting judges 34 are temporally reassigned from the
Regional Court of Sofia and from courts outside Sofia.
115. Judicial Reform Index for Bulgaria, supra note 49, at 3 (2013).
116. JSA, SG No. 29/2004, art. 169(2) (repealed SG No. 64/2007) (Bulg.).
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the Council could be removed in cases of serious misconduct.1 17
At present, a judge can be disciplined for: (1) not abiding by the
procedural deadlines and delaying adjudication, (2) breaching the
Code of Ethical Conduct, (3) compromising the reputation of the
Justice System, or (4) not fulfilling other duties."' Disciplinary
procedures may be initiated by chief the judge of the court where the
judge sits, or of a higher court, the Inspectorate of the Council, 1/5 of
the members of the Council, or the Minister of Justice.1 '9 Chief
Judges impose lighter sanctions for minor offences and they send
their orders to the Council, who within a month, may reverse or
confirm them.120  Randomly assigned panels of three Council
Members investigate. However, with more serious offenses, the
judge will make propositions to the Council, then the Council
decides whether or not to discipline the judge.121 The decision of the
Council is subject to de novo appeal before three-Justice panel of the
Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) which decision could be
finally reviewed by five-Justice panel of SAC.12 2
The disciplinary procedure is very close to a regular court
procedure, except it is not public in its initial phase.123 The frequency
of such procedures have varied since 1999. They went as low as two
in 2004124 and as high as fifty-one in 2009.125 Since then, about
fifteen disciplinary procedures have been started each year on
average.126 Most disciplinary procedures were initiated against
117. JSA, SG No. 103/2009, art. 307(2) (Bulg.).
118. JSA, SG No. 69/2008, art. 307(4) (Bulg.).
119. Id. art. 312(1) (Bulg.).
120. Id. art. 314(1)-(3) (Bulg.).
121. Id. arts. 316-320 (Bulg.).
122. Id. art. 323 (Bulg.).
123. Id. at art. 313(3) (Bulg.).
124. The Activity of the Supreme Judicial Council in Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Judges During 2004, §111.1, http://www.vss.justice.bg/page/view/1299.
125. Analysis of Disciplinary Practice of the Supreme Judicial Council in 2009, §3,
http://www.vss.justice.bg/page/view/1292.
126. Analysis of Disciplinary Practice of the Supreme Judicial Council in 2010, §1,
http://www.vss.justice.bg/page/view/1290; Report of the Disciplinary Commission of the
Council for 2011, §1, http://www.vss.justice.bg/root/f/upload/1/otcet-discpr-2011.pdf;
Report of the Disciplinary Commission of the Council for 2012, §1, http://www.vss.
justice.bg/root/f/upload/1/reportkdp_2012.pdf; Report of the Disciplinary Commission of
the Councilfor 2013, §11.1, http://www.vss.justice.bg/root/f/upload/1/repor tkdp_2013.pdf;
Report of the Disciplinary Commission of the Council for 2014, §11.1, available at
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judges of regional and district courts but there were such procedures
also against chief judges, court of appeals judges, justices, as well as
members of the Council.127  Since 2010, Chief Judges, Chief
Prosecutors, and Investigators have issued on average forty-nine
orders per year for imposing sanctions for minor disciplinary
offenses. 128
There are concerns about the arbitrary and inconsistent
sanctioning for similar offenses.129 There is no publication of SAC
opinions on disciplinary cases of judges, although that might help
resolving inconsistencies. Additionally, it could also be used as case
material to be studied at judges' training.
3. Does Bulgaria's Justice System Assures Its Judges Are
Independent in Fulfilling Their Judicial Duties?
The Justice System in Bulgaria has provided significantly stable
offices to its judges, fairly good training, and prospects for judicial
promotion. It also has developed relatively fair and transparent
disciplinary procedures, which are now in use. The promotion
process would be fairly well-balanced if not for the deficiencies of
planning, the untimely administration of competitions, and the high
value given to the legal technical exam. Influences like fear,
frustration, and maybe allegiance, affect judges when disciplinary
measures are not taken. When disciplinary measures are delayed, it
leads to poor management skills of judges.
http://www.vssjustice.bg/root/f/upload/1/reportkdp_2014.pdf
127. Supra, note 127-129.
128. Analysis of Disciplinary Practice of the Supreme Judicial Council in 2010, supra
note 129, at §4-5; Report of the Disciplinary Commission of the Council for 2011, supra
note 129, at §4-5; Report of the Disciplinary Commission of the Council for 2012, supra
note 129, at §3-4; Report of the Disciplinary Commission of the Council for 2013, supra
note 129, at §11.3-4; Report of the Disciplinary Commission of the Council for 2014, supra
note 129, at §11.3-4.
129. Judicial Reform Review, supra note 49, at 82 (2013).
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V. Conclusion - Are Bulgarian Judges Independent?
To answer this question, it might be beneficial to compare the
facts of the Kokinov case from 2013 to those of the Texim case from
1971. On April 15, 2013, Nikolay Kokinov, Chief Prosecutor of
Sofia City Prosecutor's Office'30 attended a meeting at the house of
the Prime Minister Borisov, where the former Minister of
Agriculture Najdenov was also present. During the meeting Kokinov
freely discussed a criminal investigation his Office was conducting
against Minister Najdenov and another possible investigation of
high-level governmental officials. Kokinov also asked Prime
Minister Borisov to help his promotion. After this discussion had
been reported in the media, the Council decided Kokinov's behavior
violated the Code of Ethical Conduct and removed him from office.
The decision was affirmed by a five-justice panel of SAC.1 3 1
Although the Kokinov case involved a prosecutor, while the
Texim case involved a judge, the parallels are quite strong; in the
Bulgarian system, prosecutors and judges enjoy the same guarantees
and requirements regarding independence, and face the same
temptations. Kokinov's free discussion of a pending investigation
with the person investigated and a third person, was what Chief
Judge Bajchev's superiors expected from him, but not what
happened. While both cases illustrate a pervasive culture of
influencing decision takers in the Justice System, there are nuances
that also reveal some changes.
While the Texim case is a demonstration how a system using
pressure directly intensified the fear and frustration within the
decision taker, the Kokinov case illustrates a more refined tool to
infringe independence - through failures of the character such as
vanity and maybe greed. To some extent, the Kokinov case proves
130. Nikolay Kokinov was born in 1969, graduated from law school in 1993, in 1994 he
became junior prosecutor, in 1996 prosecutor at Sofia Regional Prosecutors Office, in 1999
prosecutor at Sofia City Prosecutors Office, in 2004 Deputy Chief Prosecutor, and in 2006
Chief Prosecutor of the Sofia City Prosecutors Office (CV is on file with the author and has
the Council filing register number 96-02-053/08.11.2011).
131. Opinion ofFive-Justice Panel of the Supreme Administrative Court, No. 8599/2014
on Administrative Case No. 1406/2014, http://www.sac.government.bg/court22.nsf/d63974
29a99ee2afc225661e00383a86/cO43ba800a9d1b2dc2257d00003f466a?OpenDocument.
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that independence is a state of mind and a personal choice of the
decision-maker. The Kokinov case is also an example, however, of
how independence could be easily compromised after a fifteen-year
period during which bad practices inherited from the previous regime
had developed. This is because (1) judges' experienced almost no
accountability; (2) procedures for initial selection, appointment, and
promotion were wide open to influence; (3) the Council had little
administrative capacity; (4) trainings were unavailable; and (5) the
Code of Ethical Conduct had been not adopted. While measures for
improvement in all these areas have been implemented, it will take
more time for Bulgarians to enjoy the benefits of them. Definitely,
the Council's approach in the Kokinov case is an omen of hope and a
sign that these measures for improvement are beginning to produce
results.
236 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 39:1
